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Chapter l Introduction 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
The development of client/server technology has led to a myriad of new security 
problems. More so, the growth in Internet application has driven organizations to 
open their networks to wider audiences in order to remain competitive. Applications 
such as Customer Relation Management (CRM), Supply Chain Management (SCM) 
and E-Procurement are being widely used and deployed. Such open networks have 
exposed the organizations to intrusions. Intrusions include attempts to compromise 
the confidentiality, integrity, availability, or to bypass the security mechanisms of a 
computer system or network. 
Computer Security Institute (CSI) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of San 
Francisco (CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, 2002) have reported that 
in 1996, 16% of organizations surveyed reported intrusion to law enforcement. This 
figure has increased to 34% in year 2002. The intrusion rate is likely to be higher 
since many organizations are reluctant to admit or failure of detecting attacks. 
1.1 Introduction to network security threats 
William S. (2000) has reported that two of the most publicized threats to network 
security are intruders and malicious codes. 
1.1.l Intruders 
There are two main types of intruder: hacker and cracker. Dictionary.com defines 
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buff'. Hackers are persons who like to know how things work without malicious 
intention. On the contrary, crackers are malicious hackers with malicious intent. 
(CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, 2002) reported that 90% of the 
respondents detected computer security breaches in the past 12 months. Intruders 
could be outsiders and insiders. 
Outsiders are from outside of a corporate network. These intruders may attack both 
the external presence like deface web servers or the machines on the internal 
network. The attacks could be originated from the Internet, dial-up lines, physical 
break-ins, or extranet i.e., connections to business partner's network. 
Insiders are legitimate internal network users. These include users who misuse 
privileges or who impersonate higher privileged users. 
Besides stealing corporate information or data for profit, intruders may also launch 
denial of services (DOS) attacks. (CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, 
2002) reported that 40% of the respondent detected DOS attacks. 
1.1.2 Malicious Code Attacks 
Viruses, worms and Trojan horses are malicious codes that hide within files or 
programming codes. These codes are able to self-replicate, self-propagate or be 
spread by ignorant computer users. Nimda and CodeRed for example are worms, 
which do not require human interaction to spread, instead using known software 
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Security Survey, 2002) has reported that 85% of the respondents detected computer 
viruses. 
The attacks are capable of damaging or compromising the security of individual 
computers as well as the entire networks. Computer Economics (2001) estimates that 
virus and worm attack costs of $10.7 billion in year 2001. These costs were incurred 
to clean-up infected servers, as well as inspection of other servers. 
1.2 Impact of network security threats 
The direct impacts of network security threats include financial loss, business 
disruptions, legal liability and potential lawsuits. The indirect impacts are loss of 
competitiveness and damages to organization's brand name. Generally, (CSI/FBI 
Computer Crime and Security Survey, 2002) have shown an up trend on the losses 
reported by the respondents. Below is the statistic of the annual losses reported. 
Table 1: Total annual losses caused by computer crime 
Attacks Total annual losses (USD$ 'million) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Theft of proprietary information 20 33 42 66 151 170 
Denial of services n/a 2 3 8 4 18 
Financial fraud 24 11 39 55 92 115 
Inside abuse of net access 1 3 7 27 35 50 
Sabotage of data or networks 4 2 4 27 5 15 
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Figure 1: Total annual loss caused by computer crime 
1.2.1 Financial fraud 
Network security threats may cause unauthorized transaction being effected or 
critical data being modified. In the year 2002 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security 
Survey, 25 respondents reported losses ofUSD$115 million due to financial fraud. 
1.2.2 Loss of competitiveness 
American Society for Industrial Security and PricewaterhouseCoopers (1999) 
"Trends in Proprietary Information Loss" Survey Report cited that 70% or more of 
an organization's value rests in intellectual property assets. However, this critical 
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year 2002 CSl/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, 26 respondents reported 
financial losses over USD$170 million as a result of corporate espionage. 
1.2.3 Business disruptions 
Network security attacks may cause system downtime, which causes the loss of 
revenues. For example, Amazon and CNN suffered from a distributed denial-of 
service attack (DDOS) in February 2000 and users were denied from accessing the 
two web sites. Besides that, tremendous resources were burnt due to the idle time 
resulting from system downtime and the efforts to restore the operations. 
1.2.4 Legal liability and potential lawsuits 
Under the privacy and security regulations, organizations may need to compensate 
customers for losses suffered arising from intrusions. Also, organizations need to 
prove due diligence in prudent security governance or face potential lawsuits. 
1.2.5 Damages to organization brand name 
Successful intrusions may tarnish an organization's corporate image, which was built 
over long time and after spending millions on advertising programs. For example, 
organization that suffered theft of customer data like credit card information, will 
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1.3 Introduction to Security Measures 
Since the attacks may come either from internal or external and the severe impacts, 
organizations are inevitably need to design and implement security measures to 
ensure data security. The IDC (2002) reported that 91 % of the organizations 
surveyed in April 2002 would invest in designing and implementing security 
measures. In July 2002, IDC reported that 94% of the same organizations remain 
with the decision to invest in security measures. These security measures include 
anti-virus tools, firewall appliances and Intrusion Detection System (IDS). This 
study, however concentrates on IDS. 
1.3.l Introduction to IDS 
Robert Graham (2000) defined intrusion as an attempt to break into or misuse a 
system like stealing confidential data or distributing Spam. Intrusion detection is the 
process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer system or network and 
analyzing them for signs of intrusion. The concept of intrusion detection was first 
introduced by John Anderson (1980) through technical report "Computer Security 
Threat Monitoring and Surveillance". 
Most of the research was dated between 1980s and 1990s. Among the research, the 
Intrusion Detection Model proposed by Dorothy Denning (1987) provided a 
methodological framework for further researches in IDS. The model also formed the 
road map for IDS commercial products. According to Ant Allan (2002), IDS is 
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automation of log parsing activity to more sophisticated functions to monitor 
network traffics to detect malicious activities. 
IDS can provide assurance whether system configuration is secure and other security 
measures such as firewall operates properly. The assurance is provided through the 
following IDS functions: 
• Monitoring and analysis of users and system activities 
• Auditing of system configurations and vulnerabilities 
• Detecting changes of critical system and data files 
• Statistical analysis of network traffic patterns via matching known attacks 
• Abnormal network traffic analysis 
1.4 The importance of IDS 
While deploying security measures like anti-virus tools, firewalls and Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) can minimize the network exposure, are these security measures 
adequate? Information systems and networks are subject to attacks, especially in an 
open network environment like Internet. Perhaps, an analogy helps to better assess 
the situation. 
Imagine of a house in real life that normally is guarded by a wall and solid front gate 
with locks. However, it is always possible that a thief can probe the possible 
loopholes or weaker links such as back door, windows and the roof for intrusion. 
Eventually, the thief may sneak into the house and steal away valuable goods 
without being noticed. Hence, an alarm system that is capable of alerting the house 
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The above analogy of a house's security depicts an organization's network security. 
An intruder may be observing the organization's network for a long time without 
being noticed. While firewalls are protecting the main gateways, firewalls do not 
alert the organization of any possible vulnerability in the network infrastructure. As 
such, it is essential and timely to have IDS in place. This detection process monitors 
computer system or network activities. These activities are analyzed to detect 
possible intrusions. 
1.5 Motivation 
The site selected for this study is the Faculty Computer Science and Information 
Technology (FCSIT) network. The main motivations for this study on IDS are as 
follows: 
• Quite a number of the FCSIT computers are open to Internet and hence, 
vulnerable to attacks from outsiders. 
• Firewall is unable to detect system misconfiguration, which may pose 
security risks and allow gaps for intruders. More so, firewall is unable to 
detect any problems in the internal networks. 
• Quite often, some of the FCSIT computers are infected by malicious codes 
like CodeRed, Nimda and other computer viruses. Should these attacks be 
not detected promptly, more computers will be affected. Tremendous 
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1.6 Objective 
The main objectives of this project are as follows: 
• To study the needs for IDS 
• To study IDS 
• To analyze the FCSIT networks environment and protocols run 
• To design the IDS implementation 
• To implement the designed IDS 
• To rectify the system weaknesses noted and fine tune the IDS design 
1.7 Scope 
The scope of this project covers the network security threats and the conventional 
network security measures like firewall and anti-virus tools. Various push and pull 
factors for implementing IDS are discussed. The study reviews the selection criteria 
of IDS both available at commercial off-the shelves and open source. An IDS will 
be chosen for testing. 
This study analyzes the FCSIT network topology, hardware, software and the 
protocols running which affect the IDS implementation. Based on the analysis, 
locations to implement IDS are identified. The selected IDS is implemented at the 
FCSIT networks. The data collected from the IDS implementation is analyzed to 
identify the network and system weaknesses. These discovered weaknesses would be 
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1.8 Report organization 
Chapter 2 covers the strength and weaknesses of various types of the JDS. Popular 
IDS software available at both commercial off-the shelves and open source are 
assessed against certain evaluation criteria. An IDS is to be selected for 
implementation in FCSIT networks. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the network environment of the FCSIT, including the network 
protocols, software deployed and topology that affecting the design of IDS 
implementation. This chapter will also identify the resources that need to be 
protected and the sources of security threats. Accordingly, the implementation plan 
for IDS is designed. 
Chapter 4 details the implementation of the selected IDS in FCSIT networks. The 
details include the steps of IDS set-up at designated locations and the configurations 
of IDS. 
Chapter 5 shows the results of the implementation of the selected IDS in FCSIT 
networks. The results gathered will be analyzed and the IDS design will be fine- 
tuned to achieve the desire results i.e., strengthen the FCSIT networks security. 
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1.9 Summary 
This chapter explores the existing network security threats and conventional network 
security measures. IDS is highlighted as one of the key network security component 
complementing the conventional network security measures. 










haptcr 2 Literature Review 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
The main objectives of this chapter are to discuss the types of Network Intrusion 
Detection Systems and the corresponding strength and weaknesses. Various IDS 
available either commercial off-the shelves or open source are reviewed and 
assessed based on certain evaluation criteria. A suitable IDS will be selected for 
implementation in FCSIT networks. 
2.1 Network security attacks 
There are 2 broad category of network security attacks i.e., active attacks and 
passive attacks. Active attacks are the deliberate actions of an attacker to gain 
access to compromise the confidentiality, integrity or availability of data or 
system like DOS and break ins. Passive attacks are actions in the nature of 
eavesdropping to gather information like sniffing and information gathering. 
Most often, passive attacks are more difficult to detect since there are no 
traceable activities. Passive attacks are used together with active attacks to gain 
unauthorized access or launching DOS attacks. 
2.1.1 DOS attacks 
A DOS attack is aimed to deprive user from using the available resources of an 
organization. The attack normally will flood a resource with excessive data or 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/Intemet Protocol (IP) packets that can be 
handled. This attack will prevent a user from gaining access to computer 
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from a single host, the attacker may also use a group of computers in different 
locations to launch a DDOS attack against a target. 
According to Mandy Andreas (2001 ), there are three main types of DOS: 
l. Buffer overflows - This is the most common type of denial of service attacks 
which attacker sends more data than an application's buffer can hold. The 
extra data overflow may cause the system to crash or execute certain machine 
codes. For example, an oversized Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) 
packet may cause a target system to crash. 
2. SYN attack - This attack exploits the weakness of TCP. An attacker by 
sending a large number of SYN packets with no corresponding ACK will 
cause the receiving system to run out of memory. 
3. Teardrop attack - This attack exploits the IP. An attacker by putting a 
confusing offset value in some of the fragment packets will cause the 
receiving system unable to reassemble the packets. This will lead to system 
crash. 
2.1.2 Sniffing 
It is common that passwords or sensitive files are not encrypted while these data 
are transmitted via network. Sniffing traffic involves monitoring the network 
traffics of a targeted organization. An attacker can plant a sniffer in a network via 
a Trojan Horse program and distributed through emails or embedded into certain 
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be installed on the user s computer. This sniffer will collect the network traffic 
and send back to the attacker. 
This attack normally is overlooked since no noticeable damages are made. 
However, the information gathered through sniffing can then be used to launch 
active attacks or information stolen. 
2.1.3 Information gathering 
Before an attacker can hack into a network, the attacker normally gathers as 
much information as possible for the targets. This information includes the 
environment either human or system. Human environment is referred to the 
behavior of the personnel involved and operations. System environment includes 
the type of machines, operating systems and versions used and services running. 
Based on the information gathered, an attacker will map out the network of an 
organization. Attempts are then can be made to identify the vulnerabilities that 
can be exploit to gain access. 
According to Eric Cole (2001 ), the steps to gather information may includes the 
followings: 
• Determine target's IP address by usmg command like Whois or 
Nslookup. 
• Determine network address range by usmg American Registry for 
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• Look out for active machines through Ping command. Ping War can be 
used to do a ping sweep. 
• Map out the open ports or access points by using Portscanners, Nmap, 
ScanPort, War Dialers or THC-Scan. 
• Identify the operating system used via Queso or Nmap 
• Identify the services running via the default port and operating system, 
Telnet and vulnerability scanners like SARA, SAINT and Nessus. 
• Develop the network map by using Traceroute, Visual ping or Cheops. 
2.2 Network security measures 
The basic network security measures are anti-virus tools, firewall and recently 
IDS. 
2.2.1 Anti-Virus Tools 
Anti-virus tools are critical in the organizations' network security in defending 
against known viruses and other malicious code. The JDC (2002) reported that 
80% of the organizations surveyed are investing in anti-virus tools. However, 
these tools have their limitations since the viruses are evolved in a fast pace and 
becoming more sophisticated and widely spread. As a result, anti-virus tool 
vendors and organizations are forced to catch up with the anti-virus updates. 
2.2.2 Firewall Appliances 
Firewalls are also widely deployed by many organizations. The IDC (2002) 
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appliances. These appliances function as the front-line security mechanisms in 
protecting the organizations' networks against intrusions from external sources, 
like the Internet. Nevertheless, firewall may not cover all the external 
connections, for example unauthorized dial-ups to the Internet. Also, intrusions 
may also originate from internal of the organization, i.e., behind the firewall 
either due to accidentally or maliciously attempts to access files or systems. 
2.2.3 IDS 
An "Intrusion Detection System (IDS)" is a system collecting information from a 
variety of systems and network sources. The information gathered is further 
analyzed for detecting intrusions. IDS can be broken down into the following 
categories: 
1. Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) which monitor the network 
traffics and attempts to discover attempts to break into a system or launching 
a denial of service attack. An example is a system that monitor large number 
of TCP connection requests (SYN) to many different ports on a target 
machine. The unusual large number of requests may suggest attempts of TCP 
port scan. A NIDS may run either on a target machine which watches its own 
traffic or on an independent machine promiscuously monitoring all network 
traffic. 
2. System integrity verifiers (SIV) monitors system files to detect intrusions 
when these files were changed. Currently, "Tripwire" is the most well known 
SIV system. A SIV may watch components such as Windows registry and 
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detect escalation of privileges from a normal user to root/administrator 
privileges. SIV, hence, is best to detect changes in critical system 
components. However, SN does not provide real-time alerts upon an 
intrusion. 
3. Log file monitors (LFM) monitor network services log files. Similar to 
NIDS, LFM match log files patterns, which may suggest attacks by an 
intruder. An example is a parser for HTTP server log files that detect 
intruders who probe known security holes, such as the "phf'' attack. These 
deception systems like 'honeypots' contains pseudo-services, which emulate 
well-known vulnerabilities to trap hackers. 
2.3 Pull and push factors for implementing IDS 
There several push and pull factors that makes IDS a must, nowadays. 
2.3.1 Push factors 
The attacks on organization's systems are on the rise and even more pressing in 
Internet era due to the followings: 
1. Attackers become smarter 
Through information sharing, attackers have evolved in executing attacks and 
network subversion methods. Instead of direct attacks, which will most likely 
be filtered by firewall, attackers may deploy indirect techniques. These 
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Attackers may also launch tunneling attacks whereby traffic is masked. The 
mask can be created via encapsulation within packets corresponding to 
another network protocol, such as ICMP or domain name system (DNS). 
2. Vulnerabilities are common 
Through information sharing, common vulnerabilities are well known. 
Attackers may exploit the vulnerabilities arising from system 
misconfiguration, poorly designed software, user negligence, and well-known 
protocols and operating systems weaknesses. An example is HTTP, which is 
normally not filtered by most of the firewall. 
Besides that, free Vulnerability Assessment tools like Nessus 
(http://www.nessus.org) are widely available on the Internet. Script kiddies 
may make use of these tools to constantly scan the systems facing Internet for 
known vulnerabilities. Also, professional crackers may also be engaged to 
break into an organization's networks to steal information or data. 
3. Availability of easy-to-use "Hacker" tools 
Previously, network scanning and attack techniques are only known to 
limited computer elites. However recently, easy-to-use "Hacker" tools that 
can be deployed to conduct sophisticated analysis of a victim network are 
widely available via Internet. A few example of these tools are SubSeven, 
BackOrifce, Nmap, LOftCrack. Attackers without high level of technical 
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4. Potential of insider attacks 
Besides attacks from outsiders, insiders also could launch attacks against an 
organization's systems or carry out malicious activities. The threat is real 
because insiders are mostly legitimate users who are familiar with the 
organization's operations and security measures as well as physical access. 
Perimeter defenses like firewall cannot protect an organization from insider's 
malicious activities since these activities are executed behind the firewall. 
2.3.2 Pull factors 
There are valid benefits by deploying IDS ass follows: 
1. Deter intruders both outsiders and insiders from attacks 
Through implementation of IDS, intruders have more worry be detected and 
face punishments for attacks. This can serve as deterrent to intruders. 
2. Detect attacks that other security measures cannot prevent 
In reality, some system vulnerabilities may not be tackled due to reasons such 
as follows: 
• operating systems of legacy systems that cannot be patched or 
updated. 
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An IDS in detecting attacks will highlight the vulnerabilities to the 
administrators for corrective actions. Also, IDS provides the trails for 
monitoring system usage and can be used to detect design :flaws and assist in 
the forensic investigation of intrusions. 
3. Early detection of attempts of intrusions 
Intrusions normally involve scanning for information and probing for 
vulnerabilities in predictable stages. An IDS with proper monitoring could 
detect such suspicious activities and alert the system administrator to 
investigate further. 
From the above discussions, anti-virus and firewalls are basic defenses against 
hackers. However, these measures are inadequate to counter attacks that are 
dynamic and require in-depth network analysis. Thus, an IDS is needed and plays 
an important role in protecting networks from intrusion both from insiders as 
well as outsiders. In short, IDS should be deployed and complement other 
network security measures-firewalls, anti-virus tools, vulnerability assessment 
products, etc.-as a component of defense in depth. By combining these network 
security measures, an organization is in a better position to safeguard the 
information and systems against a realistic range of security attacks. 
2.4 IDS monitoring approaches 
Broadly, there are 2 IDS monitoring approaches i.e., Host-based Intrusion 
Detection System (HIDS) and Network-based Intrusion Detection System 
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1. Host-based Intrusion detection 
HIDS uses detection agents to collect information from host either server 
or network device. HIDS agent monitors operating systems, applications 
and other related processes events and log files as well as tracing problems to 
individual user. HIDS distributes the load of monitoring across available 
hosts and operates in encrypted and/or switched network environments. The 
strengths and weaknesses of HIDS are as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Strengths and Weaknesses of HIDS 
Strengths Weaknesses 
HIDS monitors events local to specific More maintenance required since each 
host(s) and hence, capable of tracking monitored host requires an agent be 
behavioral changes that may indicate installed, configured and maintained. 
misuse of the system 
Better load distribution smce HIDS HIDS agents consume resources of the 
distributes the monitoring load across host being monitored and may cause 
available hosts on a large network. performance issue. 
HIDS is network independence i.e., The required events and log files must 
unaffected by encrypted/switched be logged correctly for HIDS 
network traffic monitoring. 
More accountability since HIDS is able HIDS may be disabled since the host 
to monitor data access and trace and network security are maintained by 
problems to known users. different personnel. 
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part of an attack on the host like via 
denial-of-service attacks 
2. Network-based Intrusion detection 
NIDS agents collect information from the network or subnets. NIDS 
detects attacks at the network level, before the attacks reach the targeted host 
or applications. The dedicated NIDS sensor deployed on a network segment 
monitors and analyses every network packet for possible attacks. The 
strengths and weaknesses ofNIDS are as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Strengths and Weaknesses of NIDS 
network traffic, like VPNs. 
Strengths Weaknesses 
More cost effective since well-placed NIDS may be overloaded by high 
NIDS sensors can monitor a large traffic volumes and miss an attack. 
network. 
Minimum impact on operations smce Switched networks without monitoring 
NIDS sensors are passive devices or scanning port features may limit the 
without consuming hosts resources. coverage of NIDS sensors. As a result, 
more sensor need to be deployed. 
Stealth and invisible to attackers. NIDS cannot analyze encrypted 
Timeliness m detecting attacks and NIDS cannot determine whether 
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generate 
console resulting in latency problems. 
NlDS is platform-independent and is NIDS sensors may 
relatively easy to deploy and maintain. voluminous data to the management 
2.5 IDS detection approaches 
There are 2 mam detection approaches i.e., misuse and anomaly detection 
approaches. Each of the approach has strengths and weaknesses. 
1. Misuse intrusions are attacks on known system weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities. These intrusions can be detected through monitoring and 
matching of defined pattern or signatures against trails gathered by the IDS 
sensors or agents. The strengths and weaknesses of misuse detection are as 
shown in Table 4. 
Table 4: Strengths and weaknesses of misuse detection 
frequently. 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Misuse detection IS more effective Misuse detection IS confined to 
without generating a large number of detecting known attacks. Hence, the 
false positives. misuse signatures need to be updated 
Misuse detection is straightforward and Tightly defined signatures may render 
specific in diagnosing attacks. This misuse detection fail to detect variants 
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2. Anomaly intrusions are attacks, which are related to abnormal activities. 
Hence, the intrusions could be detected through observations of significant 
deviations from normal system behavior. For this approach, a profile of the 
system like average CPU usage, average hard disk space and number of 
processes per user needs to be defined. The metrics for the profile are 
normally formulated from analysis of cumulated system operation data. The 
strengths and weaknesses of anomaly detection are as shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: Strengths and weaknesses of anomaly detection 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Anomaly detection is able to observe Anomaly detection approach is likely 
abnormal behavior, which may be to produce a large number of false 
symptoms of attacks. positives because of unpredictable 
behaviors of users and networks. 
Information gathered through anomaly Anomaly detection approach requires 
detection may be used to develop much more data to define the normal 
signatures for misuse detection. behavior pattern. 
2.6 IDS architecture 
According to Ant Allan (2002), the mam thrust of IDS is automating the 
intrusion detection process. This is because the network data and/or events and 
log files involved are voluminous. More so, the detection is rather time sensitive 
to enable earlier corrective actions and minimize losses or damages. Hence, 
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An IDS has 3 main functional components i.e., 
• information sources - IDS obtains inputs or event data from one or more 
information sources like packets that flow through certain monitored 
network segment. 
• analysis - Based on the data gathered, IDS performs a pre-configured 
analysis of the event data. 
• response - The IDS generates specified responses. The responses may 
include reporting and active intervention like denying access of certain 
users or data originated from certain IP. 
Besides the 3 main components, there is also a IDS management system. This 
system facilitates a security or network administrator to monitor and configure 
IDS and analyze data. 
···1···• ........ . . Raw data 
·· ~""'"'··. ~ -. -- Monitored Analysis engine 







Analysis hosts Monitored system 
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According to Chenxi Wang, John C. Knight (2000), Figure 2 ittu trate» a generic 
IDS model adopted in many IDS implementation. In this model, information is 
gathered from the monitored sources. The information collected is then analyzed 
for intrusions. The results of the analysis are presented via a report facility either 
display on the management console or reports. 
2. 7 The IDS life cycle 
With the connection of corporate network to Internet, more new IDS products are 
introduced to meet the increasing demand of network security. Selecting a right 
product for implementation is difficult because credible and comprehensive 
evaluation information is lacking. Also, IDS implementation and maintenance 
requires specialized skills. Hence, the life cycle of IDS need to be understood. 
According to John McHugh et al. (2000), the IDS life cycle includes evaluation 
and selection, deployment, operation and use, and monitoring. 
2.7.1 Evaluation and selection 
Evaluation process is difficult because of lacking IDS standards for comparing 
IDS products. Michael Wilkison (2001) is of the view that marketing and trade 
reports on IDS are tending to be superficial and biased. Without access to 
deployment environments, an organization is unable to determine how well an 
IDS product in detecting attacks while avoiding false alarms. On the other hand, 
an organization may not afford to test objectively the IDSs since the set up cost 
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G. A. Fink et al. (2002) stated that some work has been done on formal 
taxonomy of lDSs. However, there is no definitive general accepted metrics on 
IDS. Ranum (2001) has defined various metrics for evaluating the performance 
ofIDSs. 
The key issues to be considered are accuracy of detection, detection and response 
characteristics, ease of use, user friendliness and supports in signature updates. 
Edward Amoroso and Richard Kwapniewski (1998) and Ant Allan (2002) have 
provided guidance in selecting an IDS. The NSS Group has since year 2000 
conducted evaluation tests on the major commercial and open source IDS 
products. 
An organization should consider the security needs and the resources available 
especially the IDS specialist for IDS operation and maintenance. The one 
selected should meet the organization's needs within the constraints of resources. 
2.7.2 Deployment 
Deployment process needs to consider the followings: 
• Placement of sensors to protect critical assets 
• Configure IDS in accordance to the network security policy 
• Install appropriate signatures and other initial conditions 
• Formulate IDS alerts handling and incident response procedures 










haptcr 2 Lit n aturc Review 
2.7.3 Operation and use 
Upon implementation, IDS outputs i.e., alerts must be constantly monitored, 
analyzed and responded to. The monitoring of IDS alerts is performed through a 
centralized IDS management console. The console is essential because the alerts 
are normally voluminous which will be summarized and displayed. 
2.7.4 Maintenance 
Over time, people, technology and processed will change. As and when new IDS 
or signatures are available, the existing IDS should be upgraded and the new 
signatures should to be installed. In addition, the IDS deployment including the 
placement of sensors should be reviewed to ensure the continuous effectiveness 
of the IDS. 
2.8 Evaluation of NIDS 
Evaluation of NIDS is the process of benchmarking the NIDS features and 
capabilities against a set of metrics .. On the contrary, a comparison is a process 
of 'comparing' two or more products in order to differentiate these products. A 
proper evaluation process will increase the success ofNIDS implementation. 
2.8.1 Criteria for evaluating NIDS 
The followings are some of the evaluation criteria for NIDS. However, these 
criteria are dependent on the NIDS's configuration, the network that NIDS is 
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1. Ability to detect attacks accurately 
NIDS must be accurate i.e, low false alarm rate. The potential errors of IDS 
are false positive and false negative. 
A false positive is an error which NIDS classifies a legitimate action as 
anomalous action. Excessive false positive errors will tend to cause users to 
ignore the NIDS outputs. This may lead to an intrusion being detected by 
NIDS but ignored by the users. Hence, false positive errors should be 
minimized. 
A false negative is an error, which NIDS fails to recognize an anomalous 
action. This error is more serious than false positive error because a false 
negative error gives a misleading sense of security. Hence, NIDS will not be 
able to highlight a suspicious action to the users. 
2. Detecting unknown attacks 
IDS must be able to observe deviations from normal system behavior. This 
should be the most important NIDS feature because new vulnerabilities are 
discovered every day. Nevertheless, these new attacks are the most difficult 
to detect. 
3. Stability and reliability 
NIDS must run reliably and continually in the background of the system 
being monitored without human supervision. NIDS must be fault tolerant i.e., 
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The application and operating system should be capable of running for years 
without segmentation faults or memory leakage. 
4. Consistent reporting of identical events 
NIDS should be able to detect known vulnerabilities and report identical 
events in a consistent manner. Securityfocus and CVE provide databases of 
known vulnerabilities and exploits. 
5. Security 
IDS must be accurate and difficult to fool by subversion error. A subversion 
error is an error which intruders force IDS to make a false negative error by 
modifying or blinding the IDS operations. This error is very complex and 
involves attacks on IDS operations. Hence, IDS seems to be working as 
intended but actually not. As such, IDS security should be able to withstand 
all types of attacks. ADMmutate and fragroute are two programs that are 
available and claim capable to cause the "death of the IDS''. 
6. Information provided to administrator 
NIDS alerts should provide sufficient information for tracking purposes like 
the reason the event causing the event to be raised, the source of the alert and 
the target system. NIDS alerts should also have links vulnerability databases, 
such as Bugtraq or CVE. The links will facilitate the administrator in 
assessing the relevance of the alerts and the appropriate reaction to be taken. 
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NlDS should ha the ability differentiate the relative importance and evcrity 
of attack in the alerts. Some alerts are triggered by information gathering 
events like port scanning. However, it may not be practical to investigate 
every time the network is scanned. On the other hand, indication that a local 
host has been infected by CodeRed should be given higher priority. Snort's 
alert has been ranged between 1 and 10, which 1 representing a point of 
interest and 10 representing a major security threat. 
8. Legal validity of data collected 
NIDS should be able to capture and store sufficient evidence like network 
traffic or alerts that can be used for forensic investigation and prosecutions. 
The data collected by NIDS must be legal validity of the data to enable 
effective legal actions taken against the attacker. 
9. Customization 
NIDS should be flexible and customizable to monitor the targeted networks. 
The variation could be running variety of services, different traffic volume 
and transmission speed at different network segment. 
10. Scalability 
NIDS must be able to handle changing system behavior, including addition of 
network segments. As new applications are added, the NIDS must be able to 
adapt to the changed system profile. The capability should cover the 
consolidation of reports from multiple NIDS and storage of information. 
31 
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11. Interoperability 
The most effective intrusion detection is correlating information from JDS, 
BIDS, system logs, firewall logs and any other sources available. NTDS 
should be able to communicate with other IDSs of different vendors. 
12. Vendor support 
NIDS vendor should has the number of qualified staff to support 
implementing the system. 
13. Signature updates 
NIDS signature must be available as new vulnerabilities and exploits are 
discovered. NIDS should allow the administrator to create their own 
signatures without relying folly on the vendor to supply updates. 
Alternatively, there should be support from the NIDS community like Snort. 
2.9 Selection of IDS product 
The NSS Group (2001) (2002) has conducted evaluation tests on the major 
commercial and open source IDSs annually since year 2000. Michael Wilkison 
(2001) stated in a SANS paper that the NSS report is the most comprehensive 
i.e., products coverage and scientific evaluation of IDS. In the year 2002 IDS 
tests, the NIDS products that have been tested are as follows: 
• Cisco Secure IDS 2.5 Model 4230 (formerly known as NetRanger) 
• Internet Security Systems RealSecure 7.0 
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These tests cover both qualitative and quantitative analysis. The qualitative 
analysis on IDS features and functions was performed by IDS specialists. The 
quantitative analysis involved controlled laboratory tests. The earlier versions of 
test were conducted fully in laboratory by using traffic generated by Adtech 
AX/4000 broadband test system and a Smartbits SMB6000. The shortcomings 
were false alarms and the generated traffic would be differing from the actual 
attacks. However, in year 2002, the test methodology has brought in real world 
element i.e., real traffic and real sessions. 
These tests include checks on specific IDS performance indicators as follows: 
• Test 1: Attack recognition 
• Test 2: Stress tests 
• Test 3: Ability to resist fools 
• Test 4: Stateful operations 
A summary of the compiled test results are shown in Table 6, 7, 8 9 and 10. 
Table 6: Test 1 
Attack Recognition Attacks 
No. of attacks detected by NIDS 
Cisco ISS Snort 
Application bugs 5 0 4 4 
Back Doors/Trojans/DDOS 11 8 9 11 
DOS 16 10 13 10 
7 - Finger 2 7 6 
FTP 11 9 11 6 
HTTP 18 11 15 12 
ICMP 2 2 0 2 
Mail 7 6 6 4 
Malicious Data Input 3 0 2 1 
Reconnaissance 10 8 8 5 
SNMP 2 1 2 0 
SANS Top 20 (network- 17 10 17 13 
based attacks only) 
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Table 7: Test 2 
NIDS 
Network utilization 
Stress tests 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 
Cisco 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Small ( 64 byte) packet test ISS 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% (max 148,000pps) Snort 100% 100% 76% 46% 37% 
Cisco 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 
"Real world" packet test ISS 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% (max 40,000pps) Snort 100% 100% 15% 10% 6% 
Cisco 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Large (1514 byte) packet test ISS 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% (max 8172pps) Snort 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Table 8: Test 3 
IDS Evasion Techniques NIDS Attacks Detected? Decoded? 
Cisco 17 13 13 
Fragroute ISS 17 17 17 
Snort 17 14 14 
Cisco 9 7 7 
Whisker ISS 9 9 9 
Snort 9 6 5 
Cisco 9 8 8 
Other techniques ISS 14 14 14 
Snort 11 9 9 
Table 9: Test 4 (a) 
Stateful Operation (attack replay) NIDS False DOS? 
Pos? 
Cisco y N 
Stick ISS y N 
Snort y N 
Cisco y N 
Snot ISS y N 
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Table 10: Test 4 (b) 
Stateful Operation ('000 
No. of simultaneous NIDS 10 25 50 100 250 500 1,000 
open connections 
Cisco y y y y y y y 
Detecting attacks ISS y y y y y y N 
Snort y y y y y y y 
Cisco y y y y N N N 
Maintaining state ISS y y y y y y N 
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Table 11 : Summary of evaluation 
Criteria Cisco ISS Snort Notes 
-../ -../ 
- 
0 Cost x Snort is a freeware 
1 Ability to detect attacks -../ -../ -../ 
accurately 
2 Detecting unknown attacks x -../ -../ No anomaly detection 
feature 
3 Stability and reliability -../ -../ -../ 
4 Consistent reporting of x -../ -../ Signatures are 
identical events generic "group". 
Hence, the reported 
attack names are 
verv non-specific. 
5 Security (resist evasions) -../ -../ -../ 
6 Information provided to -../ -../ -../ 
administrator 
7 Severity and potential -../ -../ -../ 
damage 
8 Legal validity of data x -../ -../ Cisco has no 
collected adequate reporting 
and analysis 
functions. 
9 Customization -../ -../ -../ 
10 Scalability -../ -../ -../ 
11 Interoperability -../ x x Cisco product is 
packed with Cisco 
firewall, router and 
VPN 
12 Vendor support -../ -../ NIA 
13 Signature updates -../ -../ -../ Snort allows users to 
write new signatures. 
!SS has included a 
'Trons module' to 
import Snort 
signatures. 
Based on the evaluation made by NSS as summarized in Table 10, Snort is an 
open source freeware and free to download from http://www.snort.org. 
Nevertheless, Snort is compatible to the major NIDS in the market. Thought 
Snort is lacking of the graphical and user-friendly interfaces, there are full 











More so, Snort has a large number of signatures available and the u ers can 
develop new signatures or modify signatures to tune for reduced false positives. 
The users also can download new and latest signatures from 
http://www.snort.org since there is large support community. For reporting and 
analysis, there are numerous freeware solutions available like ACID and 
SnortSnarf. 
Hence, this study selects Snort as the NIDS for implementation at the FCSIT 
networks. At the time of writing, Snort 1.9 is the latest Unix-based of Snort 
available. 
2.10 Summary 
This chapter explains the network security attacks and security measures. From 
there, the needs of IDS as the second line of defense on top of firewall and anti- 
virus tools are explored. 
Various approaches of IDS in monitoring and detecting attacks as well as the 
corresponding strengths and weaknesses are studied. This chapter also covered 
the IDS architecture and the life cycle of IDS. The evaluation criterion of IDS is 
reviewed and the evaluation results released by NSS Group is taken as the basis 
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Chapter 3 Analysis and Design 
This chapter is to present the analysis and design of implementing Snort in 
FCSIT network. The first section will discuss the FCSIT physical and virtual 
network environment. The network environment encompasses the networks 
topology, network peripherals deployed and the protocols running. Then, the 
next section will discuss the Snort configurations and signature updating. Lastly, 
the chapter will cover the design of Snort implementation in FCSIT networks. 
3.1 FCSIT physical networks 
Overall, FCSIT networks operate on Fast Ethernet (FE) and Gigabit Ethernet 
(GE) technology. FCSIT adopted star network topology and the networks are 

















Figure 3 : FCSIT physical networks 
Analy, i· and Design 
Main Building FCSIT 
Second Floor 
First Floor 
Based on Figure 3, the Main Building and Annexed Building are connected 
through GE. The Main and annex building are connected by two core switches. 
These are CISCO Catalyst 6006 switches, as shown in Figure 4. Both core 
switches are equipped with MSFC module which support layer 3 routing. These 
two core switches are connected through two pairs of multimode Fiber. The total 
backbone throughput is 2Gbps. 
39 
Ground Floor 
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Figure 4: Snapshot of Cisco Catalyst 6006 
Access switches connect to the two core switches through FE or GE. These 
switches are either Cisco Catalyst 2924XL or Catalyst 2950G switches as shown 
in Figure 5 and 6. 
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Figure 6: Snapshot of Cisco Catalyst 294450G 
3.1.1 Switches and routers 
Switches operate in both the physical and data-link layers and divides a large 
network into smaller segments. The traffics of each segment are separated and 
switches are able to filter traffics by relaying frames from an originating node of 
a segment to the recipient at the other segment. The routing between VLANs is 
done through routers. In a switched network environment, network traffics of 
different segments are separated since these segments are in different collision 
domains. This feature will cause Snort unable to sniff traffics from certain 
network segments. 
This weakness in switches for implementing Snort is overcome by built in port 
monitoring or mirroring function, i.e., Switched Port Analyzer (SPAN). The 
network traffic that needs to be monitored can be selected by a network analyzer 
such as a SwitchProbe device or other Remote Monitoring (RMON) probe. 
SP AN mirrors traffic from multiple source ports on multiple VLANs to a 
destination port for analysis. However, the source ports and the destination port 
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Figure 7: Example SPAN Configuration 
In Figure 7 for example, source port is ES and the traffic is mirrored to port 10. A 
network analyzer on port 10 receives all network traffic from port 5 without 
being physically attached to it. 
The advantages of span are: 
• Easy to implement. Snort can be placed on the switch without modifying 
the core infrastructure. 
• No additional hardware or special configuration changes to manage 
Snort. 
The disadvantages of span are: 
• Only one port is available to be spanned at a time. Hence, monitoring of 
multiple machines can be difficult or impossible. 
• According to Arhijit Sarmah (2001), Span more than one port can 
overload the span port, causing dropped traffic. 
• Span will open Snort to attacks. However, this can be rectified by 
implementing the Snort in stealth mode. 











3.2 FCSIT virtual network 
Anaty, 1 and Design 
FCSIT networks are switched and subdivided into multiple virtual local area 
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Based on Figure 8, the VLANs are connected to the Campus network through 
two core switches that support layer 3 routing. These two switches are defined as 
primary and secondary in supporting different user groups. Each of these 
switches runs Hot Standby Router Protocol (HSRP) and Network Address 
Translation (NAT). 
3.2.1 VLANs 
A logical group of hosts in a VLAN can communicate as if these hosts were on 
the same LAN. The effect is that hosts of a VLAN can be located physically at 
different buildings, in this case, the different floors of FCSIT Main and Annexed 
Buildings. This is handled through switches that can forward traffic through 
unicast, multicast, and broadcast to the hosts of intended VLAN at different LAN 
segments. The operation of VLAN is defined in the IEEE 802.lQ 
intemetworking standards for VLANs. 
According to Cisco (2003), a VLAN can be created by configuring the 
parameters for the VLAN (name, domain and port assignments) of a switch via 
Telnet. The hosts connected to the assigned ports will form part of that VLAN. 
VLANs can span across multiple switches. Likewise, multiple VLANs could sit 
in a switch. The VLANs on multiple switches communicate via a trunking 
process. Trunking is the technology that allows information from multiple 
VLANs to be carried over a single link between switches. VLAN Trunking 
Protocol (VTP), a layer 2 messaging protocol is the protocol that enables the 
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managed within VTP domain i.e., network devices that share the same Y1 P 
domain name and that are interconnected with trunks. 
VLAN s are connected to each others through EtherChannel which connected the 
LAN switches via unshielded twisted-pair (UTP) wiring or single mode and 
multimode fiber. EtherChannels could be Fast EtherChannel and Gigabit 
EtherChannel. These EtherChannel allows multiple physical Ethernet links to be 
combined into one logical channel. This allows load sharing of traffic among the 
links in the channel as well as redundancy in the event that one or more links in 
the channel should fail. 
In VLANs, VLAN Membership Policy Server (VMPS) assigns switch ports 
dynamically based on the source MAC address of the device connected to the 
port. When a host is moved from a port of a switch to a port of another switch, 
the switch assigns the new port to the proper VLAN for that host dynamically. 
Snort can be installed and connected to a destination port to monitor traffics of 
various switch ports for VLANs. SPAN can be set to monitor the followings: 
• Monitor a single source port by using set span command and the syntax 
is: set span <source port> <destination port>. 
• Monitor more than one source ports by using set span command and the 
syntax is: set span <source ports> <destination port>. 
• Monitor local traffic for an entire VLAN by using set span command and 
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• Monitor a Trunk i.e., the traffic for all the VLANs on this trunk will be 
monitored. 
3.2.2 HSRP 
In order to provide almost full uptime of the routers, Cisco Catalyst 6006 router 
provides HSRP as one of the redundancy technique. This redundancy enables 
two or more routers act as a single "virtual" router via sharing of an IP and MAC 
addresses. These routers exchange status messages periodically. The Active 
router is enabled by configuring the highest priority value. When a higher 
priority router preempts a lower priority router, the higher priority Active router 
will send a coup message. The lower priority active router will revert to speak 
state and send a resign message upon discover another router with higher 
priority. 
If the Active router ceases functioning, the Standby router can take over the 
routing responsibility of the Active router. In the case of Standby router failure, 
another router can be select from a defined group of routers to be the new 
Standby router. With this, packets can be consistently sent to the same IP and 
MAC addresses and the take over of router is transparent. 
However, the above fail-over service imposes a challenge to Snort 
implementation. This is because a single attack may flow through different routes 
and required multi-probe correlation, which is difficult and sometime impossible 
to reconstruct the attacks. On the other hand, if the assumption is that system 
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systems is covered. To monitor the traffics of either one of these routers, Snort 
can be installed at location B or C in the FCSIT virtual networks. However, due 
to the HSRP, Snort may not be able to capture certain traffics should any one of 
these routers fails. Hence, location A i.e., the between gateway to Campus 
network and the two routers will be appropriate to place the Snort. At location A, 
Snort is able to see all in and out ofFCSIT via the Campus network. 
3.2.3 Network Address Translation (NAT) 
For global communications on Internet, unique global IP addresses registered 
with IANA are required. Most of the time, the number of global IP addresses is 
much smaller than the number of hosts that are maintained in an organization's 
networks. Hence, private IP addresses are used for internal network 
communications. These hosts however, need to use NAT for communication 
with external networks via Internet. 
NAT can work in the following ways: 
1. Static NAT - A local IP address is mapped to a global IP address. This is 
useful for hosts that require direct access from public networks. 
2. Dynamic NAT - A local IP address is mapped to one of a group of global IP 
addresses. 
3. Overloading - Multiple local IP addresses are mapped to a single global IP 
address by using different port numbers. Hence, this NAT is also known as 
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For the FCSIT networks, NAT will impact on the analysis of Snort outputs if the 
traffics behind the core switches are monitored. These locations are either A, B 
or C. The IP addresses shown in the Snort outputs are global IP addresses and the 
specific host behind the core switches cannot be determined. Hence, the Snort 
outputs that involved NAT will require further analysis to gauge the possible 
VLANs that are affected. Snort will then be installed to monitor the suspected 
VLANs in order to identify the source hosts. 
3.3 Analysis of Snort 
Snort as a NIDS focus on performance, simplicity, and flexibility. 
3.3.1 Snort Architecture 
Snort architecture is made up of three key subsystems namely packet decoder, 
detection engine, and logging and alerting. 
1. Packet Decoder - Supports the Ethernet, SLIP and PPP mediums. The packet 
decoder prepares the data for the detection engine to perform pattern 
matching in an expedient manner. 
2. Detection Engine - Analyzes every packet based on the Snort rules that are 
loaded at runtime. The detection engine recursively analyzes every packet 
based on the loaded Snort rule files. An action specified in the rule definition 
is triggered as soon as the first rule matches the decoded packet. However, a 
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3. Logger/Alerter - Makes up of logging and alerting subcomponents. By 
default, Snort logs are written in the /var/log/Snort folder, and Snort alerts are 
written to the /var/log/Snort/alerts file. 
Nalneesh Gaur (2001) has provided a simplified representation of these 
components are shown in Figure 9. 
i---.• no ·~a~~ 






Figure 9 : Snort architecture 
3.3.2 Installation 
Snort was written for Unix/Linux systems and currently support Windows 
platform. However for this project, Snort which runs on Unix environment is 
used. The latest Snort source programs and detection rules can be downloaded 
free from http://www.snort.org. The installation instructions are also available for 
download. In addition, more details are also available as comments in Snort 
source code and configuration files. Snort can be either installed through pre- 
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Since Snort is a libpcap-based packet sniffer and logger, libpcap is also required. 
Libpcap is a library interfacing with the operating system's device drivers to 
capture packets. Libpcap program can be easily downloaded from Internet 
through Google Search. 
Besides, Snort merely provides basic intrusion detection functions without user- 
friendly management interface or reporting capability. Hence, certain front-end 
management and back-end reporting programs may need to be added. The front- 
end management programs are like Demarc and IDS Center. The back-end 
reporting programs are like SnortSnarf and ACID. These programs can be 
downloaded free from http://www.snort.org. For this project, data analysis will 
be performed via Silicon Defense's perl-based snort log analyzer. 
3.3.3 Configuration 
Snort can run in one of three modes i.e., sniffer, packet logger and intrusion 
detection through command line. Among the three modes, intrusion detection is 
the most complex which match network traffics against user defined rule sets and 
generates alerts as defined 
Snort is configured through the ASCII snort.conf file. This file contains several 
sections i.e., network variable definitions, preprocessors, output modules, log and 
alert settings, and rule sets to include. This snort.conf file must be configured by 
using Editor to reflect the local network needs. More detailed options can be 
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1. Snort Variables 
Network variables such as HOME_NET and EXTERNAL_NET must be 
defined to reflect the network topology to be monitored. In a complex 
environment, defining HOME_NET and EXTERNAL_NET may be difficult. 
Hence, Sandro Poppi (2002) suggest that these variables can be set to ANY. 
2. Snort Preprocessors 
Preprocessors make Snort functionality modular and can be extended through 
plug-ins. There are nine Snort preprocessors available. These processors are 
port scan detector, fragmentation reassembly and stateful analysis and 
BackOrifice detector and traffic normalization for HTTP, RPC, FTP and 
Telnet sessions. Also, there is SP ADE (Statistical Packet Anomaly Detection 
Engine), a detection engine to perform statistical anomaly detection on the 
network. 
Preprocessor codes are run after packets have been decoded, but before the 
detection engine is called. Preprocessors are included and configured using 
the keyword - preprocessor. The preprocessor directive format in the Snort 
rules file is: 
preprocessor <name>: <options> 
The more preprocessors loaded will lead to more triggers for alarms. This 
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3. Snort Output Modules 
Snort output modules are run after the preprocessors and detection engine 
and the outputs are packet logs and alerts. Alerting will generates both alerts 
and logs of the same packet. However, logging does not automatically 
generate an alert. There are twelve Snort alert alerting and logging options. 
The output processor options set in snort.conf can be modified via command 
line switches. 
Alerting can be either "fast", "full" or turned off. Alerts can be written to 
numerous destinations such as ASCII log files, binary files, syslog, SQL 
databases, XML files, Unix sockets, SNMP traps or Windows pop-up 
messages. E-mail alerting can also be included with third party tools. Alerts 
are written to a single file. 
Packet logs can be set to record complete or brief packet contents to the same 
range of output locations and, like alerts, can be disabled if chosen. However, 
packet logs are written to individual ASCII files contained within an 
extended hierarchical directory structure based on source IP address and alert 
type. 
Since writing large numbers of ASCII files into numerous subdirectories is 
slow, Snort provides a binary logging option to write logs to a tcpdump 
binary file. This file can be analyzed through a back-end analysis tool such as 
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4. Snort Rule Sets 
Snort rules are stored in ASCII file and can either be created or edited using 
editor. Snort rules consist of two logical parts: the rule header and options. 
Figure 10: Rule Header and Options Details 
From Figure 10, Snort rule is simple and the language is relatively easy to 
learn. More details on writing rules can be found at 
http://www.snort.org/writinq snort rules.htm. In addition, new rules can be 
found at the arachNIDS database, maintained by Max Vision as well as the 
Snort Web site. These rules can be incorporated into the snort.conf file by 
using the "include" directive. When including the new rules, full-qualified 
pathnames should be used. For example: 
include /etc/snort/vision.rules 
Since this project uses the shipped Snort, all the rule files and 
classification.config have been pre-configured and can be included into the 
Snort configuration. However, the configuration of classification types can 
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3.4 Implementation design 
Design of Snort implementation is largely dependent on FCSJT network 
environment. However, there are some common locations that NIDS can be 
installed to monitor network traffics in an organization. 
These common logical locations for NIDS are as follows: 
• Between internal network and Public network. This is the "red zone" 
where most of the traffic can be seen. IDS must be configured to be the 
least sensitive. This zone will see the most false alarms. 
• In the DMZ behind the Firewall to identify the attacks on servers in DMZ 
that have penetrated firewall. This is the "green zone". A well configured 
firewall only allows known/authorized traffic to enter this zone and less 
false alarms are expected in this zone 
• Between the firewall and internal network to identify attacks that have 
penetrated the firewall. This is the trusted, "blue zone". Attacks that 
reaches this zone is considered hostile and require reactions. This zone 
should have the least number of false alarms. 
For the FCSIT network environment, firewall and DMZ are not deployed. 
However, FCSIT has implemented multiple VLANs supported by Cisco switches 
and run HSRP for fail over services. Hence, Snort at location A i.e., between the 
two core switches and the Campus network will be able to see all the inbound 
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Nevertheless, Snort may also need to monitor the traffics at various VLANs. This 
is because FCSIT networks apply NAT and the only way to identify the source 
host is to span the VLANs or suspected ports. At times, there are also occasions 
where Snort need to be installed at VLANs to monitor the traffics of internal 
network to detect insider attacks. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter studies the FCSIT network environment for both the physical and 
virtual networks. The key elements of FCSIT networks like switches, VLAN, 
HSRP and NAT as well as the impacts on Snort implementation are discussed. 
This chapter also analyzes Snort in more details as a NIDS. These details include 
Snort configurations, signature updates and reporting functions. Lastly, the 
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Chapter 4 Implementation 
The chapter presents the implementation of Snort in FCSIT networks. The 
implementation involved installing Snort as the intrusion detection system. This 
includes configuring switches to perform ports monitoring and analysis on 
different VLANs. Lastly, SnortSnarf is used to convert the log file into HTML 
format. 
4.1 Snort installation 
Snort is implemented on SUN Solaris platform with two network interface cards 
(NICs) installed. One of the NIC is used to monitor the network, and the second 
is used for normal networking purposes. The following details the hardware and 
software specifications. 
4.1.1 Hardware specifications 
• SUN Ultra 10 
• SUN SparcIIi 445MHz processor 
• 1 Gbytes RAM memory 
• 2 NIC 10/100 Mbps 
• 40 GB hard disk storage 
4.1.2 Software specifications 
• Solaris 8 (SunOS 5.8) Operating Environment (SP ARC platforms) 
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• SnortSnarf021 ll l.1 
• Apache 2.0 
4.1.2.1 Solaris 8 (SunOS 5.8) 
Solaris 8 is shipped with Practical Extraction and Report Language (Perl) 
5.005_03 and Apache web server. 
Perl is a free general purpose programming software to develop complex system 
administration tasks, such as graphic, network, and web programming. Some of 
the core modules included with this Solaris Perl installation are CGI, 
NDBM_File, and Getopt. 
Apache is an open source HTTP web server and is one of the most popular web 
servers on the Internet. The shipped version includes all the standard Apache 
modules, which include proxy server support. 
4.1.2.1 Snort installation 
Snort 1.9.0 binaries can be downloaded from http://www.snort.org. However, in 
order for Snort to sniff packets, libpcap is required. Libpcap0.6.2 can be 
downloaded from http://www.tcpdurnp.org. 
Installing libpcap-0.6.2 by running the following commands (# is the prompt 
sign): 
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Installing Snort by running the following commands (# is the prompt sign) : 




After finished installing Snort, the Snort.conf file needs to be configured in order 
to customize the network variables, preprocessors, output options and the rule 
sets. The four major steps involved are as follows: 
# Step #1: Set the network variables: 
var HOME NET 
[10.100.0.0/16,202.185.107.0/24,202.185.108.0/24,202.185.109.0/24 
l 
var EXTERNAL_NET any 
var DNS_SERVERS $HOME_NET 
var SMTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET 
var HTTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET 
var SQL_SERVERS $HOME_NET 
var TELNET_SERVERS $HOME_NET 
var HTTP PORTS 80 
var SHELLCODE PORTS !80 
var ORACLE_PORTS 1521 




var RULE PATH .. /rules 
#Step #2: Configure preprocessors 
preprocessor frag2 




preprocessor rpc_decode: 111 
preprocessor bo: -nobrute 
preprocessor telnet decode 
preprocessor asnl decode 
disable_evasion alerts 




preprocessor conversation: allowed_ip_protocols all, timeout 60, 
max conversations 32000 
preprocessor portscan2: scanners max 3200, targets_max 5000, 
target_limit 5, port_limit 20, timeout 60 
#Step #3: Configure output plugins 
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include $RULE PATH/web-cgi.rules 
include $RULE=PATH/web-coldfusion.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/web-iis.rules 
include $RULE PATH/web-frontpage.rules 
include $RULE=PATH/web-misc.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/web-client.rules 














include $RULE PATH/other-ids.rules 
#include $RULE_PATH/web-attacks.rules 
#include $RULE_PATH/backdoor.rules 
#include $RULE PATH/shellcode.rules 
#include $RULE-PATH/policy.rules 
#include $RULE_PATH/porn.rules 








In order to simplify the execution of Snort at command line, a batch file 
(snort_command) has been created with the content as follows: 
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The mode of this file has to be changed to executable (# is the prompt sign): 
# chmod +x snort command 
This file has to be placed in the same directory with the Snort executable 
program. The two NI Cs are represented with hmeO and hrne 1. The command 
above shows that the sniffing process is run on interface hme 1 and the log file is 
stored m /export/home/idslog directory. The rule sets m 
.. /rules/ snort. conf are applied. 
To run Snort, . /snort_ command is executed and Snort is initiated. The results 
are as follows : 
# ./snort_command 
Initializing Output Plugins! 
Log directory= /export/home/idslog 
Initializing Network Interface hmel 
Initializing Snort==-- 
Decoding Ethernet on interface hmel 
Initializing Preprocessors! 
Initializing Plug-ins! 
Parsing Rules file .. /rules/snort.conf 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
Initializing rule chains ... 
No arguments to frag2 directive, setting defaults to: 
Fragment timeout: 60 seconds 
Fragment memory cap: 4194304 bytes 
Fragment min ttl: O 
Fragment ttl limit: 5 
Fragment Problems: O 
Stream4 config: 
Stateful inspection: ACTIVE 
Session statistics: INACTIVE 
Session timeout: 30 seconds 
Session memory cap: 8388608 bytes 
State alerts: INACTIVE 
Evasion alerts: INACTIVE 
Scan alerts: ACTIVE 
Log Flushed Streams: INACTIVE 
MinTTL: 1 
TTL Limit: 5 
Async Link: O 
No arguments to stream4_reassemble, setting defaults: 
Reassemble client: ACTIVE 
Reassemble server: INACTIVE 
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Reassembly alerts: ACTIVE 
Reassembly method: FAVOR OLD 
http_decode arguments: 
Unicode decoding 
IIS alternate Unicode decoding 
IIS double encoding vuln 
Flip backslash to slash 
Include additional whitespace separators 
Ports to decode http on: 80 
rpc_decode arguments: 
Ports to decode RPC on: 111 32771 
telnet_decode arguments: 
Ports to decode telnet on: 21 23 25 119 
Conversation Config: 
KeepStats: O 
Conv Count: 32000 
Timeout : 60 
Alert Odd?: O 
Allowed IP Protocols: All 
1323 Snort rules read ... 
1323 Option Chains linked into 140 Chain Headers 
O Dynamic rules 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
Rule application order: ->activation->dynamic->alert->pass->log 
--==Initialization Complete==-- 
-*>Snort! <*- 
Version 1.9.0 (Build 209) 
By Martin Roesch (roesch@sourcefire.com, www.snort.org) 
To stop the snort process, press Ctrl-c. 
4.1.2.3 SnortSnarf installation 
SnortSnarf is a Perl program, which grabs snort's log file and produce HTML 
web pages for further analysis. The latest copy of SnortSnarf 021111.1 can be 
downloaded from http://www.silicondefense.com. 
SnortSnarf-021111.1 IS installed by using the following commands (# IS the 
prompt sign): 
#tar -zxvf SnortSnarf-021111.1.tar.gz 
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The installed directory of SnortSnarf is in /export/home/root/CnortSnarf- 
021111. 1. To view the contents of the directory, the commands below are 
applied: 














In order to simplify the execution of SnortSnarf at command line, a batch file 
(snorthtml) has been created with the content as follows: 
./snortsnarf.pl /export/home/idslog/alert 
The mode of this file has to be changed to ex~cutable (#is the prompt sign): 
# chmod +x snorthtml 
This file has to be placed in the same directory with the SnortSnarf executable 
program. SnortSnarfs SnortFilelnput module reads alerts from Snort's alert 
output files stored at /export/home/idslog/alert. 
To run SnortSnarf, . I snorthtml is executed and SnortSnarf is initiated (# is the 
prompt sign). 
# ./snorthtml 
The outputs of HTML web pages are stored in snfout. alert directory. To view 
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# cd snfout.alert 
#ls 
202 208 index.html sig toporcs.html 
203 209 SDlogo.gif topdests.html 
# 
The web pages of the alerts are stored into the respective directories such as 202, 
203, 208 and 209. The main page is presented index. html, which indicates 
summary of all the signatures. A summary of the top 20 source IPs is presented 
in topsrcs .html. A summary of the top 20 destination IPs is presented in 
topdests. html. 
4.1.2.4 Apache installation 
Apache is the most popular open-source HTTP web server. Apache 2.0.36 
binaries can be downloaded from http://www.apache.org. snfout. alert needs 
to be linked to Apache server default documents directory. 
Installing Apache-2.0.36 by running the following commands (# is the prompt 
sign): 




The default documents directory for Apache server is in /var/apache/htdocs. 
The contents of /var/apache/htdocs are as follows(# is the prompt sign): 
# cd /var/apache/htdocs 
#ls -1 
total 214 
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dr-xr-xr-x 2 root other 512 Aug 13 2000 Apps 
dr-xr-xr-x 2 root other 512 Feb 6 2002 Data 
-rw-r--r-- 1 root bin 1622 Jan 22 2002 index.html 
-rw-r--r-- 1 root bin 1877 May 16 2001 index.html.ca 
-rw-r--r-- 1 root bin 1623 May 16 2001 index.html.cz 
-rw-r--r-- 1 root bin 2263 May 16 2001 index.html.de 
-rw-r--r-- 1 root bin 1550 May 16 2001 index.html.dk 
-rw-r--r-- 1 root bin 1870 May 16 2001 index.html.ee 
-rw-r--r-- 1 root bin 1358 May 16 2001 index.html.en 
-rw-r--r-- 1 root bin 1772 May 16 2001 index.html.es 
-rw-r--r-- 1 root bin 1794 May 16 2001 index.html.fr 
-rw-r--r-- 1 root bin 1826 May 16 2001 index.html.it 
-rw-r--r-- 1 root bin 1623 May 16 2001 index.html.ja.jis 
-rw-r--r-- 1 root bin 1887 May 16 2001 index.html.lu 
-rw-r--r-- 1 root bin 2010 May 16 2001 index.html.nl 
-rw-r--r-- 1 root bin 1951 May 16 2001.index.html.po.iso-pl 
-rw-r--r-- 1 root bin 1825 May 16 2001 index.html.pt 
-rw-r--r-- 1 root bin 1920 May 16 2001 index.html.pt-hr 
-rw-r--r-- 1 root bin 1683 May 16 2001 index.html.se 
-r--r--r-- 1 root other 15037 Jul 22 1999 ReadMe.html 
-r--r--r-- 1 root other 11327 Jul 22 1999 ReadMe.txt 
drwxr-xr-x 5 root other 512 Mar 19 15:01 routersim 
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root other 50 Jan 27 11:53 snort -> 
/export/home/root /SnortSnarf-021111.1/snfout.alert 
-r--r--r-- 1 root other 35028 Aug 31 1998 splash.JPG 
-r--r--r-- 1 root other 2162 Jul 20 1999 start.html 
# 
The snort directory IS linked to I export/home/ root/ Snort Snarf - 
021111.1/snfout.alert. 
4.2 Switches configuration 
The switches used by FCSIT is supporting multiple VLANs are core switches 
and access switches. Core switches are Catalyst 6006 and the access switches are 
either Cisco Catalyst 2924XL or Catalyst 2950G. 
4.2.1 Core Switch configuration 
The SP AN of core switch is configured through telnet to the Cisco systems 
console. The command of set span is issued to activate the switch analyzer and 
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either a port, a range of ports or VLANs. The direction of traffics to be 
monitored can be further detailed into transmit (tx), receive (rx) or both. 






















The results of the implementation of configured monitoring by core switch are as 
follows: 
PrimaryCat6 (enable) 
2003 May 29 15:43:01 %SYS-5-SPAN_CFGSTATECHG:local span session 
active for destination port 3/3 
To cease the earlier set monitoring by core switch, set span disable is issued 
and the results are as follows: 
PrimaryCat6 (enable) set span disable 
This command will disable all span session(s). 
Do you want to continue (y/n) [n]?y 
Disabled all local span sessions 
Primarycat6 (enable) 2003 May 29 15:43:12 %SYS-5- 
SPAN CFGSTATECHG:local span session inactive for destination port 
3/3 
PrimaryCat6 (enable) 
4.2.2 Access Switch configuration 
The port monitoring session of access switch is configured by defining a 
destination port with source ports and source VLANs. The monitoring is not 
activated unless the destination port and at least one source port or VLAN for 
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To set up a port monitoring session 1, the existing port monitoring session 
configuration is cleared by setting no monitor session. In order to mirror bi- 
directional traffics to port 1 from port 10 on interface 0, monitor session 
command is used for both source and destination port. The entries are as follows: 
Switch(config)# configure terminal 
Switch(config)# no monitor session 1 
Switch(config)# monitor session 1 source interface 
fastEthernet0/1 
Switch(config)# monitor session 1 destination interface 
fastEthernet0/10 encapsulation dotlq 
Switch(config)# end 
To end port monitoring, the existing port monitoring session configuration is 
cleared by setting no monitor session. The entries are as follows: 
Switch(config)# configure terminal 
Switch(config)# no monitor session 
Switch(config)# end 
4.2.3 Snort Implementation Location 
The location of implementing Snort is very much dependant on the network 
segments that need to be monitored. As HSRP, NAT and VLAN design will 
affect the sniffing of traffics, the Snort implementation location must be correctly 
identified. 
4.2.3.l HSRP, NAT, VLAN 
From the analysis presented in Chapter 3, whenever the core switch is down, 
HSRP will cause the traffic to be rerouted to the standby switch. If the 
monitoring is done at the primary core switch, traffics will not be captured. 
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backbone, the Snort should be implemented in location A of J igurc 8. This 
location will ensure all inbound and outbound traffics of FCSIT networks are 
captured. 
However, implementing Snort in location A may cause inaccurate results. This is 
because some of the sources may not be ascertained since NAT has converted the 
private IP addresses into global IP addresses for outbound traffics. Hence, at 
times, monitoring at per VLAN basis is also necessary in order to determine the 
private IP addresses of source. 
4.3 Alert file and log files analysis 
After configure the switch to monitor the identified traffic, Snort can be activated 
by issuing snort_ command. A statistic of the network traffics sniffed and 
analyzed are as follows: 
================================================================= 
Snort analyzed 915 out of 915 packets, dropping 0(0.000%) packets 
Breakdown by protocol: Action Stats: 
TCP: 0 (0.000%) ALERTS: 0 
UDP: 8 (0. 874%) LOGGED: 0 
ICMP: 0 (0.000%) PASSED: 0 
ARP: 0 (0.000%) 
EAPOL: 0 (0.000%) 
IPv6: 0 (0.000%) 
IPX: 9 (O. 984%) 
OTHER: 898 (98.142%) 
DISCARD: 0 (0. 000%) 
================================================================= 
Wireless Stats: 
Breakdown by type: 
Management Packets: O 
Control Packets: O 






Fragmented IP Packets: 0 
Fragment Trackers: O 
Rebuilt IP Packets: O 














Frag2 memory faults: O 
==================================================·······-·====== 
TCP Stream Reassembly Stats: 
TCP Packets Used: O 
Stream Trackers: O 
Stream flushes: O 
Segments used: O 
Stream4 Memory Faults: O 
(0.000%) 
================================================================= 
Snort received signal 2, exiting 
# 
For the events when the monitored traffics match with the applied rule sets, alerts 
are initiated and are stored in alert file. The events are also logged and the 
details are stored into the individual log file, which identified by source IP 
address. For example, one of the source IP is 202.185.107.204. The log files and 
alert file generated are stored at I export/home/ ids log directory. The contents 
of /export/home/idslog are as follows(# is the prompt sign): 









Alerts are the records indicating a match with the rule sets. The contents of the 
alerts are issued according to time sequence. The alerts indicate both the source 
and destination IPs and ports. The events are classified and prioritized according 
to the applied definitions in Snort classification.cont. To facilitate the 
analysis of alerts, references such as Snort Signature Database (SID), 
SecurityFocus' Bugtraq, Common Vulnerabilities and Exploits (CVE) and 
Arachnids are also indicated. The contents of the alert file are as follows (# is 
the prompt sign): 
#more alert 
[**] (1: 1560: 4] WEB-MISC /doc/ access (**] 
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05/26-15:13:47.396888 202.185.107.204:2795 -> 209.202.216.12:80 
TCP TTL:l27 TOS:OxO ID:40392 IpLen:20 DgmLen:326 DF 
***AP*** Seq: Ox6AC3F692 Ack: Ox362D8388 Win: OxFAFO TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => bugtraq 318) [Xref => eve CVE-1999-0678) 
[**) [l: 1560 :4) WEB-MISC /doc/ access [**] 
[Classification: access to a potentially vulnerable web 
application) [Priority:2) 
05/26-15:13:47.832807 202.185.107.204:2801 -> 209.202.218.10:80 
TCP TTL:127 TOS:OxO ID:40411 IpLen:20 DgmLen:366 DF 
***AP*** Seq: Ox6AC7D630 Ack: Ox395C51BF Win: OxFAFO TcpLen: 20 




[**) [l: 895: 5] WEB-CGI redirect access [**) 
[Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2) 
05/26-15:15:26.063891 202.185.107.204:2891 -> 208.185.211.71:80 
TCP TTL:127 TOS:OxO ID:41213 IpLen:20 DgmLen:446 DF 
***AP*** Seq: Ox6C74FBE1 Ack: OxC295E29E Win: OxFFFF TcpLen: 
20 [Xref => eve CVE-2000-0382] [Xref => bugtraq 1179) 
[**) [1: 862: 6) WEB-CGI csh access [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2] 
05/26-15:15:40.715339 202.185.109.30:1953 -> 203.166.138.124:80 
TCP TTL:127 TOS:OxO ID:18757 IpLen:20 DgmLen:492 DF 
***AP*** Seq: Ox4D3193C Ack: OxC9658E8B Win: Ox40BO TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => eve CAN-1999-0509) [Xref => url 
www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1996-ll.html) 
# 
From the above details of alerts, the first of an alert show the name of the 
signature that triggers an alert. The second line of an alert indicates the 
classification of signature and the priority set. The third line of an alert shows the 
date and time of alerts generated. The source IP and destination IP as well 
service ports are also specified. The fourth and fifth line of an alert presents the 
packet header information. The last line of an alert shows the references such as 
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Log files include the packet information. The contents of 202 .rss .101. 204 log 
file are as follows (# is the prompt sign): 
# cd 202.18S.107.204 
#ls 
TCP:279S-80 TCP:2810-80 TCP:2843-80 TCP:2891-80 
TCP:2801-80 TCP:2842-80 TCP:2868-80 
#more TCP:2891-80 
[**) WEB-CGI redirect access [**) 
OS/26-1S:1S:26.063891 202.18S.107.204:2891 -> 208.18S.211.71:80 
TCP TTL:127 TOS:OxO ID:41213 IpLen:20 DgmLen:446 DF 
***AP*** Seq: Ox6C74FBE1 Ack: OxC29SE29E Win: OxFFFF TcpLen: 
20 
47 4S S4 20 2F 70 6F 70 73 2F 6S SA 7S 6C 61 SO 
6F 70 S3 63 72 69 70 74 32 2E 61 73 70 3F 44 S3 
SF 49 44 3D 33 30 36 30 36 33 26 44 6F 6D 61 69 
6E 3D 77 77 77 2E 70 61 6E 69 73 6C 61 6D 69 63 
2E 63 6F 6D 26 SO 6F 73 3D 4C 69 73 74 31 38 26 
S7 3D 32 37 3S 26 48 3D 33 33 30 26 SS 31 3D 68 
74 74 70 3A 2F 2F 77 77 77 2E 6S 7A 7S 6C 61 2E 
63 6F 6D 2F 6S SA 7S 6C 61 2F 72 6S 64 69 72 6S 
63 74 2F 72 6S 64 69 72 6S 63 74 2E 61 73 70 3F 
44 S3 SF 49 44 3D 33 30 36 30 36 33 26 SS 32 3D 
68 74 74 70 3A 2F 2F 77 77 77 2E 6S 7A 7S 6C 61 
2E 63 6F 6D 2F 70 6F 70 73 2F 69 6D 61 67 6S 73 
2F 32 37 3S 78 33 33 30 42 6C 7S 6S S3 74 72 69 
70 6S 2E 67 69 66 20 48 S4 S4 SO 2F 31 2E 31 OD 
OA 41 63 63 65 70 74 3A 20 2A 2F 2A OD OA 11 63 
63 6S 70 74 2D 4C 61 6E 67 7S 61 67 6S 3A 20 6S 
6E 2D 7S 73 OD OA 41 63 63 6S 70 74 2D 4S 6E 63 
6F 64 69 6E 67 3A 20 67 7A 69 70 2C 20 64 6S 66 
6C 61 74 6S OD OA SS 73 6S 72 2D 41 67 6S 6E 74 
3A 20 4D 6F 7A 69 6C 6C 61 2F 34 2E 30 20 28 63 
6F 6D 70 61 74 69 62 6C 6S 3B 20 4D S3 49 4S 20 
3S 2E 30 31 3B 20 S7 69 6E 64 6F 77 73 20 4E S4 
20 3S 2E 30 29 OD OA 48 6F 73 74 3A 20 77 77 77 
2E 6S 7A 7S 6C 61 2E 63 6F 6D OD OA 43 6F 6E 6E 
6S 63 74 69 6F 6E 3A 20 4B 6S 6S 70 2D 41 6C 69 















pe. gif HTTP/1.1. 
.Accept: */* .. Ac 
cept-Language: e 
n-us .. Accept-Enc 
oding: gzip, def 
late .. User-Agent 
: Mozilla/4.0 (c 
ompatible; MSIE 
S.01; Windows NT 
S. O) .. Host: www 
. ezula. com .. Conn 
ection: Keep-Ali 
ve .... 
This chapter studies the implementation of Snort in FCSIT networks. The study 
details the steps of installation and the configurations of hardware and software 
as well as network devices involved to effect the intrusion detection. Some of the 
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Chapter 5 Analysis of results 
The chapter presents the analysis of results for the implementations of Snort in 
FCSIT networks. Based on the analysis, Snort is fine tuned to minimize false 
alarms and improve detection of intrusions. 
5.1 Analysis of results - FCSIT network monitoring 
SnortSnarf provides analysis of Snort log files and alert file by signatures, source 
IPs and destination JPs. Snort was implemented on Location A as shown in 
Figure 8. 4,782 alerts were captured on March 25, 2003 between 10:34 and 
11:15. These alerts originated from 332 source IPs targeted 645 destination IPs. 
A summary of full details of these signatures, top 20 source JPs and destination 
IPs is tabled in Appendix A. SnortSnarf has provided with the references such as 
Snort Signature Database (SID), CERT's CVE and SecurityFocus' Bugtraq to 
understand and analyze the alerts. 
Snort signatures are classified and prioritized to facilitate analysis. The severity 
of the signature's priority by default as set by Snort is 1, 2 or 3 and this priority 
can be edited in the classification.conf. The meaning of the priority setting 
is as follows: 
• 1 - alerts about traffic that is definitely hostile 
• 2 - alerts about benign normal network traffic 
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4,782 alerts are made up of 46 signatures. For each of the signature, there is a 
link to the summary, which indicates all the source IPs and destination IPs 
relating to that signature. 
Table 12 : Analysis of all Snort signatures 
Priority No. of signatures No. of alerts % of alerts 
1 14 706 14.76 
2 27 3,219 67.31 
3 4 764 15.98 
n/a 1 93 1.94 
46 4,782 100.00 
5.1.1 Analysis of Snort alerts with priority 1 
There are 706 alerts make up of 14 signatures with priority 1. The top 3 
signatures made up of 94% of the alerts of priority 1. These 3 signatures are 
WEB-IIS ISAPI .ida attempt (48%), WEB-IIS cmd.exe access (43%) and POP 3 
PASS overflow attempt (3%). The balance of 11 signatures contributes to 6% of 
the alerts with priority 1. A summary of alerts for signatures with priority 1 is 
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Figure 11 : Alerts due to signature with priority 1 
5.1.1.1 WEB-US ISAPI .ida attempt 
This signature is related to CodeRed attacks. Microsoft US 4.0 and US 5.0 allow 
a remote attacker to obtain the pathname of the document root by requesting non- 
existent files with .ida or .idq extensions. This vulnerability existed in the 
indexing service used by Microsoft IIS 4.0 and US 5.0 running on Windows 
NT,Windows 2000, and beta versions of Windows XP. 
There are 346 alerts issued arising from the WEB-US ISAPI .ida attempt. 25 
source IPs and 266 destination IPs are involved. Out of the 346 alerts, 261 alerts 
are attributable to 202.185.107.146. The top 10 source IPs causing the alerts is 















Cl> 100 < 
:it 50 
0 
Figure 12 : Top 10 source IPs causing alert on WEB-HS ISAPI .ida attempt 
5.1.1.2 WEB-US cmd.exe access 
This signature is closely related to CodeRed attacks. In CodeRed attacks, a 
backdoor is installed into affected systems by copying the standard Windows 
NT/2000 command interpreter "cmd.exe" into web server's "scripts" directory. 
This backdoor will allow any web surfer to execute commands on the infected 
web site by typing related URLs to the web location. 
There are 302 alerts issued arising from the WEB-HS cmd.exe access. 26 source 
IPs and 262 destination IPs are involved. Out of the 346 alerts, 213 alerts are 
attributable to 202.185 .107.146. The top 10 source IPs causing the alerts is 
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Figure 13: Top 10 source IPs causing alert on WEB-IIS cmd.exe access 
5.1.1.3 WEB-HS CodeRed v2 root.exe access 
WEB-IIS CodeRed v2 root.exe access involves attempts to access the root.exe 
executable on a webserver. Normally, root.exe access is detected as part of an 
attempted infection by a CodeRed infected machine. 
There is one source IP and destination IP that are involved i.e., the source IP is 
202.31.238.56 and the destination IP is 202.185.109.22. Destination IP 
202.185.109.22 also suffers from WEB-IIS ISAPI .ida attempt and WEB-IIS 
cmd.exe access. 
5.1.1.4 Corrective actions 
From the analysis of the source IPs, both the WEB-IIS ISAPI .ida attempt and 
WEB-HS cmd.exe access are related to CodeRed attacks. More so, the source IPs 
for the causing alerts on WEB-IIS ISAPI .ida attempt and WEB-HS cmd.exe 
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In view that CodeRed is network worm and can spread through self-replication, 
the originating and target machines need to be checked for possible infections. 
These machines are identified based on both the source and destination IPs. 
For these identified machines, the following actions need to be taken: 
• Check these machines for signs of compromise. If a machine is infected 
by CodeRed, the machine must be removed from the network and 
cleaned. 
• Rectify the configuration error to avoid WEB-IIS ISAPI .ida attempt by 
not serving .ida or .idq files from a network share. 
• Check and ensure that the IIS implementation is fully patched. 
• Check and ensure that the underlying operating system is fully patched. 
5.1.2 Analysis of Snort alerts with priority 2 
There are 3,219 alerts make up of 27 signatures with priority 2. The top 3 
signatures contribute to 90% of the alerts of priority 2. These signatures are 
ICMP redirect net (55%), ICMP redirect host (26%) and ICMP PING NMAP 
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Figure 14 : Alerts due to signature with priority 2 
5.1.2.1 ICMP Redirect Network 
ICMP Redirect Network packets may be sent in certain normal situations to save 
network administrators from having to keep extensive routing tables on hosts. 
However, an attacker may send corrupted ICMP Redirect Net message (Type 5, 
Code 0) to a network trying to crash a system. This, nevertheless, may also 
generate false alarms since any ICMP Redirect Network will trigger alerts. 
There are 1,780 alerts issued arising from the ICMP redirect net. 14 source IPs 
and 2 destination IPs are involved. None of the source IPs are FCSIT's while the 
2 destination IPs are 202.185.107.146 and 202.185.109.61. The distribution of 
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Figure 16: Destination IPs that received the ICMP Redirect Network message 
5.1.2.2 ICMP Redirect Host 
Normally, gateway devices generate an ICMP Redirect Host datagram if there is 
a shorter route to a particular destination exists. The ICMP Redirect message is 
sent back to the host that originally generated the traffic. An attacker may ICMP 
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device. This, nevertheless, may also generate false alarms since any JCMP 
Redirect Host will trigger alerts. 
There are 833 alerts issued arising from the ICMP redirect host. 3 source IPs and 
2 destination IPs are involved. None of the source IPs are FCSIT's while the 2 
destination IPs are 202.185.107.146 and 202.185.109.61. The distribution of the 
alerts is shown in Figure 17 and 18. 
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Figure 17 : Source IPs that trigger ICMP redirect host alerts 
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5.1.2.3 ICMP PING NMAP 
A user with root access may send ICMP ping through NMAP to ascertain 
whether the host is alive. NMAP's ICMP ping, by default, sends zero data as part 
of the ping. This ICMP ping may be part of an attacker's information gathering 
process. This, nevertheless, may also generate false alarms since any NMAP's 
ICMP ping will trigger alerts. 
There are 278 alerts issued arising from the ICMP redirect host. 3 source IPs and 
2 destination IPs are involved. The 3 source IPs are FCSIT's i.e., 
202.185.109.169, 202.185.109.12 and 202.185.109.223 while the 2 destination 
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Figure 20 : Destination IPs that received ICMP ping 
5.1.2.4 Corrective actions 
From the analysis of the destination IPs, 202.185.107.146 and 202.185.109.61 
are the 2 destination IPs that have received numerous ICMP redirect messages. 
While some ICMP redirect messages may be valid in certain situations, these 
unusual high numbers of messages tend to suggest malicious traffic. More so, the 
hosts of these 2 IPs are also likely to be infected by CodeRed. This is evidenced 
by the significant higher incidences of WEB-IIS ISAPI .ida attempt and WEB- 
IIS cmd.exe access. 
For these identified machines, the following actions need to be taken: 
• For ICMP Redirect Network, SP4 patches for Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 
need to be updated on the affected machines. 
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• For ICMP PING NMAP, other suspicious traffic from these hosts needs 
to be assessed for possible malicious attacks. Except for 202.185.109.12 
which could be affected by CodeRed and need to be further investigated, 
The traffic of other 2 source IPs seems normal and the alerts arising from 
these 2 IPs may be ignored. 
• To assist in investigation, further information about source or destination 
IP can be obtained through Whois look up at ARIN or other look up 
links. Figure 21 is a snapshot of the ARIN look up for 133.160.238.100. 
Output from ARIN Whols 
ARIN Home Page ~ ARIN Wbgjs Help HEWI Database & Template Cgnyersjon Information Center 
Search for: 11 SubmrtOueiy 
Search results for: 133.160.230.100 
OrQName:: Japan Network Information Center 
OrgID: JNIC 
J.ddress: Ko"k"u.sai-kougyou-1'anda Bldg 6T 









Figure 21 : Snapshot of ARIN look up on 133.160.238.100 
5.1.3 Analysis of Snort alerts with priority 3 
There are 764 alerts make up of 4 signatures with priority 3. The top 2 signatures 
made up of 99.08% of the alerts of priority 3. These signatures are ICMP 
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ICMP PING speedera (7%). A summary of alerts for signatures with pri rit 
depicted in Figure 22. 
I, 
0% 




o ICMP Destination 
Unreachable 
(Communication with 
Destination Host is 
Administratively 
Prohibited) [sid] 
O ICMP PING CyberKit 
2.2 Windows [sid] 
[arachNIDS] 
92% 
igurc 22 : Alerts due to signature with priority 3 
5.1.3.1 I MP Destination Unreachable ( ommunication Admini tratively 
Prohibited) 
A r utcr, whi h iltcrs c rtain packets, will issue l MP estinati n nrcachablc 
mes age t alert the host inv Jved r the unrca hablc dcstinati n . I I w vcr, thi 
me a c may b attributable l ur c addrc s. 
Al similar ituati n may ur when ·1 lar c p rt an is Iaunchc l ma k the 
tru ur c the an. This n '1 ti! ·I .ss, may t n irutc fut c alarms. 
"h 1 • 111 I I 11 ·1t. issu ·cl nnsinu f'r 11\ th· I 'Ml l -. tinuti 11 nreuchnl le 
IP 1r in 
111mu11i ntin11 lmi11i, trnti 1 Pr hil it ·d . I 7 H 111 · II : uud d · tinnri n 
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are 202.185.107.146 and 202.185.109.61. The distributi n of the alert 
in Figure 23 and 24. 
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Figure 23 : Source IPs that trigger I MP estination nreachable message 
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5.1.3.3 Corrective actions 
From the analysis of the destination IPs, 202.l 5.107.14 and 20 .\ -.10 . )\ 
are the 2 destination IPs that have r civcd M 
destination messages. The unusual high number f IT\ t nd t • u 
malicious traffic as infected by odeRcd a explained in ti n . l. .4. 
In view of the excessive number of I MP messages, the cause of such traffic 
should be determined. The investigation includes looking up for information 
about the sources through look up links such as ARIN. For example, a snapshot 
of ARIN for 161.142.32.233 in ·igurc 25 shows that the source IP belongs to 
Mi mos. In fact, most of the top source IPs are attributable to Mimos. 
Output rrom ARIN Whols 
So rch kif, 
Starch ruult1for:181.142.3:2.233 
O.:QN ... 1 MIO 
Ql01 
Adl1Ut•1 UR au::h , T•ChnOlOUY P• k K•l•V•U 
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5.2 Analysis of results - VLAN monitoring 
Based on the Top 20 source I Ps for n rt implcm ntati n at I nt ion /\, th r ts 
an IP which is related to NAT i.e., 202.185.108.225 a h 
Top 20 destination IPs for Sn rt implcmcntati n al I ati n A 
202.185. l 08.225 is one of the top ranked dcstinati n IPs a h wn m rr -7. 
Flo [dt - '"""'"' look I~ 
~- • ... • 11) Ill ~I """"' ,_tao 3,.,.i. CJ • (;.) Gl · ~ 
-"' C1~" ond """"4"""'*"'1-Doc-"Vl<fO<\VtJt11-t\l-l9\l"P"O I•"' ~ r1il> 
"Sri O· ~-r, ""'"' · J l!L!l•-...h <)..,,...,., · .,,,,...,., · · G#MO • fl•-l!W • 9- ·<ii'-· » 
• Snort narf summary page 
Top 20 source IPs 
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igure 27 : A snapshot of the Top 20 destination IPs 
One of the key signatures detected as triggered by source 202.185.108.225 is 
S AN Pr xy (8080) attempt. The nly destination IP I which alerts arc 
triggered is 202.185.158.88 and the port is 8080. This is further detailed in the 
n rt alert a b I w: 
[**) (1:620:2) SCAN Proxy (8080) t mp ("'*) 
(Cl ssi ic ion: At mpt d nform tion L k] (Pr'o y: 2) 
03/2s-10:34:5s.o00040 202. as. oe.22s:204s -> 202.105.1se.00:0000 
TCP TTL:l27 TOS:OxO ID:35084 IpL n:20 DgmL n:48 DF 
******S* s ; OXB FA97 Ack: oxo Win: Ox2000 Tc L n: 28 
TCP Op ions (4) •> MSS: 1460 NOP NOP S ckOK 
m thi IP r 'I re sent th ii bal II fi r ull und tru f · fr m 'rtain II st with 
1 ri at' IPs, rn 1 • study 11 th VL N trn Ii . i, r · [uir ·d t id ·nti y th r .al 
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h. 11 •n 
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ndm y 
7 • 1pt111 d 11 Mm ·h 2 , 20 










Chapter 5 Results and Anal sis 
11:15 and 11:24. These alerts originated from 122 source IP tuructcd '4 
destination 
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igure 29 : A snapshot of the Top 2 destination IPs 
From the analysis f signatures that trigger the alerts f r source IP l .100.1.17 
and destination IP 202.185.158.88 is AN Pr xy (8080) attempt. Tw example 
of the details of AN Proxy (8080 attempt alerts are as shown bcl w: 
[**) (1:620:2) SCAN Proxy (8080) mp· (**) 
(C oo'f c t Lon : A mpt d nform 'on L k) (Pro y: 2) 
03/25-11: 6:01.667642 202. 85.108.225:2702 - 202.185.158.88:8080 
TCP TTL:l27 TOS:OXO 0:34762 pL n:20 DgmL n:48 DF 
**** S* s : Ox57 A89E 1\ck: oxo W'n: OxF/\FO •rcpw n: 28 
TCP Optiono (4) •> MSS: 460 NOP NOP S ckOK 
[**) (8080) 
(Cl C\ lon: 1\ ln om 
03/25-1 :21\: ·s.030G7 10. oo.i.7 :21 
TC TTL:128 TO :OxO JD:3 2 2 lpL n:20 
* ~ ox pt PF02A Ac : oxo win: 
TC 0 ion ( ) M'' : I •I 0 NOi NOP '' 
[ * 1 
\kl lo i y: 2) 
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port used is 1 - 1024. Hence, this suggests that the behavi r f I 0.1 . l .17( ts 
abnormal and further investigation n the host rnachin sh uld b 
5.3 ummary 
This chapter analyzes the outputs f n rt a a r suit f impl m nt ti n in 
FCSIT networks by using SnortSnarf a free back-end analyzer. The alerts ha e 
been analyzed according to the corresponding priority of signature classification. 
More discussion is made on those alerts triggered by signatures with priority of 
1. Corrective actions to rectify the situations have also been discussed. The 
analysis also covers the effect of NAT on the nort outputs and the subsequent 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions and future works 
6.1 Conclusions 
This project focuses on the implemcntati n 1 uc . Th 
Snort and the testing site for implementati n is in lT n I\ rk . h tu 
involves detailed discussion of IDS, analysis of F IT n tworks and Snort, 
implementation of nort. The nort results ar analyz d and the Snort 
implementation design is fine-tuned. 
The study began by discussing the current network security threats and network 
security measures. The outcome inevitably highlights the importance of ID as 
the sec nd line of def n e. Next the sci cti n and evaluation of w re 
explored given the vari u c mmercial c nd p n s urce 1 . This has led t the 
selecti n f n rt, a free, pen s urcc lightweight, multi-platf rm and 
customizable s Ilwarc f r this pr jcct. 
In hapt r , th irn] J m ntati n 1 uc f n rt were scrutiniz d. Th LT 
netw rk run w re analyz I. • he impa t th 
VAN witche , H RP and NAT n n rt implcm ntuti n have c n 
onsidered. n rt ha als be n studied t nsurc pr p ir n rt nfigurati n. he 
I t ntiul ati 11 • ri r impl ·m .ntuti u 'I'' id inti I I. 
th. 
ub · iqu .ntly irnpl 111L'tlt in 
tt.'ll It f ti." lit' l ii' nd illHllyl'. 'I and 










Upon implementing Snort in F SIT, alerts and log files have been sue 
captured and analyzed by using n rt narf. The analy is f result was d tnil 1 
in Chapter 5. With the assistance f reference built int 
CVE, Bugtraq and ArachNTD, the attacks or pr blem arc tudi d. Tn ndditi n, 
corresponding corrective actions have been made. The 
investigation to determine the pos ible infected machines, applying s curity 
patches and changes to the Snort configurations. ln short, the study has met the 
objective and covered the scope set in hapter 1. 
6.2 Suggestions for future works 
Many improvements can be made to this implementation of Snort, which 
includes the stealth capabilitie real time monitoring, TDS maintenance and 
incident handling pr cedures. Logically, I will be the target for attacks or be 
Io led by attackers. Henc , the I should have the stealth capability to av id 
becoming the attacker' target. I utputs should also be analyzed together 
with other netw rk inf rmation gathered, such as through network traffic 
analysi . hi sh uld pr vidc a 111 rec mplete picture malici us activity. 
Alert ar , n rated and stor d as and when any traffic that match the rule set. 
However an adrninistrat r will n t be aware f these alerts until the alerts arc 
analyze 1. In rd r lo pr vi le a tim ly 111 nit ring, the al nts ·ncratcd sh uld b 
: int l th udministrut r n r ·al tim · bu ·i . N ·v n th ·I .ss, the adrninistrat r 
1, 











The IDS implemented should be maintained continuously. Th' mniru nnncc 
includes the continuous fine-tuning lo minimize fal c alarms nnd n1 l 1t 'S f 
latest attack signatures. Also, the II S vcrsi n and n 1 iurnti 
reviewed in relation to changes in the network cnvir nm nt nd 1 
Finally, yet importantly, there should be appr priate incid nt-handling 
procedures. These procedures are essential to ensur that appropriate corr cti e 
actions are taken against the security incidents. The security incidents include 
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Al All nort ignaturcs 
4782 alerts found using input module Snort ,ilclnput, withs ur 
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Earliest alert at 10:34:34.800094 on 0312512003 
Latest alert at 11:15:11.161459 on 0312512003 
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rank ti 1 797 alerts 202.185.134.65 1 signatures 
202.185.109.61, 
202.185.107.146 
I rank #2 I 490 alerts 1202.185.107.l 46 r 4 signatures I (222 destination IPs) 
I rank #3 I 355 alerts I 133.160.238.100 I 1 signatures I 202.185.107.146 
I rank #4 I 289 alerts 202.185.1 os.22s I 22 signatures I ( 43 destination IPs) 
I rank #5 I 162 alerts I 202.34.237.5 l I 2 signatures I 202.185.107.146 
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I rank 118 I 144 alert 11 21 1.4.1 9' . 0 I I signature I 202.185.107.146 
I rank 119 I 141 alerts 11 202.16.222.254 I I signatures I 202.185.107.146 
rank 139 alerts 202.185.l 09.12 
2 signatures 192.168.1.85, 161.142.23.18 
#10 
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A2 Top 20 Source IPs 
in] nt m fol 
lfilg~sec~ionJ..1.1W jT 
This page provides summary Wormntion 
SnortFilelnput, with sources: 
• /export/home/idslog25032003/alert 
The most active source !Ps arc shown. Rank is determined by the numb r f al rts , 'th th t 1 






















A3 Top 20 Destination IPs 
This page provides summary information ab 111 al 1 ts 
Snortf'ilelnput, with sources: 
/export/home/idslog2503 2003/a lert 
The most active destination IPs arc hown. Rank is detcrrnin d by th numb r 
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